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INTRODUCTION
Longstanding notions of sovereignty fall apart when it
comes to cyber operations.1
Lieutenant General Robert Schmidle,
Deputy Commander of US Cyber Command

As stated in the quote that begins this Article, cyber
activities in general, and cyber warfare in particular, place stress
on the traditional notions of sovereignty, challenging both
belligerent nations and neutral nations in the application of law
to cyber operations during international armed conflict. As
cyber capabilities increase both at the national level and at the
nonstate actor level, the principle of sovereignty will continue to
come under increasing pressure to provide clarity to a paradigm
that eschews attributability of actors and characterization of
actions.2
Despite these apparent difficulties, the law of neutrality is
still a binding legal doctrine in the cyber age. It can have
increasing utility by incorporating modern understandings of its
applicability to international armed conflicts and by extending
its coverage to parties and nonparties in noninternational
armed conflicts.
Consider the following scenario. State G and State X are in
an international armed conflict. State G wants to conduct a
cyber attack on State X, but avoid attribution of the attack. To
facilitate this, State G takes the following actions:
An agent of State G uses his tourist passport to lawfully
enter neutral State H, carrying a cyber tool on a thumb drive.
1. David Perera, Schmidle: Cyber Ops Might Require New Combatant Command
(May
15,
2011,
4:29
PM),
Structure,
FIERCEGOVERNMENTIT
http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/schmidle-cyber-ops-might-require-newcombatant-command-structure/2011-05-15.
2. Duncan B. Hollis, An e-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 397–404
(2011).
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Once within State H, G’s agent enters a cyber café and plugs the
thumb drive into one of the computers. Upon activation, the
cyber tool is copied to the hard drive and establishes a signaling
beacon that then broadcasts across the Internet and awaits
contact by another prearranged cyber tool.
Shortly thereafter, another agent of State G offers free
thumb drives under the guise of a promotional gimmick from a
local business to customers boarding a commercial cruise ship
flagged in neutral State M, leaving from a port in neutral State
R. Once the cruise ship leaves the port (and has likely entered
the high seas), any customer who plugs the thumb drive into the
ship’s passenger computers will upload a malicious malware that
will become resident on the ship’s computer system. The ship’s
computers connect to the Internet through a commercial
carrier satellite operated by a company registered in neutral
State F. Once the computer is connected to the Internet, the
malicious malware on the ship’s computer sends a signal across
the Internet, seeking the beacon that is now resident on the
computer in State H.
Once the shipboard cyber tool has connected with the
beacon, a code is executed that sends a malicious cyber program
to the beacon. Upon arrival at the computer in State H, it
combines with the cyber tool at the beacon and creates cyber
malware that is then forwarded to a computer in State X. State G
previously gained access to that computer through the work of a
citizen of neutral State J, which State G had hired for that
purpose. Once the cyber malware reaches the computer in State
X, it initiates an action that amounts to an attack on State X that
causes death and destruction.
Part I of this Article analyzes this scenario and its wider
implications. It determines that the law of neutrality applies in
most instances to cyber operations during international armed
conflict and supplies an adequate framework for responding to
such actions. This Part also highlights some key points where it
does not. While nations still have the legal obligation to both
respect the doctrine of neutrality while in international armed
conflict and to abide by it when not a belligerent, some elements
of the Internet and its infrastructure require an evolved
application of neutrality by both belligerents and neutrals.
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Now consider the following modification to the above
scenario. Rather than international armed conflict between two
states, assume a scenario where a nonstate actor, such as a
terrorist organization, takes these actions against State X. This
modified scenario creates perplexing questions as to the
application of the law and certainly does not implicate the laws
of neutrality since there is no international armed conflict
occurring.
Part II of this Article analyzes a modified scenario involving
the terrorist organization and demonstrates that traditional
principles of sovereignty, including neutrality, have limited
application as a matter of law to noninternational armed
conflicts against transnational organizations such as terrorist
organizations. Part III proposes that borrowing the doctrines of
neutrality and applying them more fully to noninternational
armed conflicts will facilitate states’ ability to adequately respond
to situations similar to the modified scenario and provide an
additional legal paradigm that states that are not a party to the
noninternational armed conflict (“NIAC”) can apply to help
prevent escalation and maintain their lack of involvement.
I. CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
The scenario in the Introduction assumes that State G and
State X are involved in an international armed conflict (“IAC”).
As a result of that assumption, the law of armed conflict, or
LOAC, applies to their conflict.3 The LOAC contains robust
provisions governing the interaction and use of force between
State G and State X, including the Geneva4 and Hague
Conventions.5
3. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need
to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 295, 300–09
(2007); Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Untying the Gordian Knot: A Proposal for
Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on Terror, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 787,
796–98 (2008).
4. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva
Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 6
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The LOAC also provides rules on the interactions between
belligerent states, G and X, and states that are not involved in
the conflict, otherwise known as neutral states. The interaction
with these states is governed by the law of neutrality.6
A. The Law of Neutrality
The law of neutrality has ancient origins7 and is one of the
most fundamental and longstanding principles of the LOAC.
Substantially codified in the 1907 Hague Convention (V)
Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons
in Case of War on Land (“Hague V”)8 and Hague Convention
(XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in
Naval War (“Hague XIII”),9 the principle of neutrality serves two
primary functions. First, it prohibits certain activities by
belligerent nations that might detrimentally impact the neutral
nation and draw the neutral nation into the conflict either
unwillingly or unwittingly.10 Second, it requires neutral nations
to take certain actions and refrain from taking other actions in
order to enforce and maintain that neutrality, including treating
all belligerents equally.11 These two principles provide
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
5. Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 [hereinafter Hague II]; Hague Convention (IV) Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague
IV]; Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and
Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310 [hereinafter Hague V];
Hague Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in
Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415 [hereinafter Hague XIII].
6. See, e.g., Hague V, supra note 5.
7. PHILIP C. JESSUP & FRANCIS DEÁK, 1 NEUTRALITY, ITS HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND
LAW 1, 4 (1935).
8. See Hague V, supra note 5.
9. See Hague XIII, supra note 5.
10. See, e.g., id. arts. 5, 18; see also OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS &
HEADQUARTERS ET AL., DEP’T OF THE NAVY, NWP 1-14M, THE COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ch. 7 (2007), available at
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a9b8e92d-2c8d-4779-9925-0defea93325c/114M_(Jul_2007)_(NWP).
11. See HUMANITARIAN POLICY & CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE ¶¶ 166–67, at 52
(Program on Humanitarian Policy & Conflict Research, Harv. Univ. ed., 2009). The
Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations states: “The law of neutrality serves
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belligerents with predictability, knowing that they generally
need not worry about hostile activities coming from neutral
nations.
Exhaustive commentaries on the law of neutrality have
been written elsewhere,12 making detailed analysis unnecessary
here. It is important to note, however, that the law of neutrality
has survived the formation of the United Nations (“UN”) and
the promulgation of the UN Charter13 and continues to be
applied both in practice,14 in recent manuals and commentaries
on the LOAC,15 and in the writings of scholars on cyber
operations.16

to localize war, to limit conduct of war both on land and sea, and to lessen the impact
of war on international commerce.” OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS &
HEADQUARTERS ET AL., supra note 10, ¶ 7.1.
12. See, e.g., VIITH CONGRESS OF THE INT’L ASS’N OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF NEUTRALITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD COMMISSION (1960); ERIK J. S.
CASTRÉN, THE PRESENT LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY (1954); ELIZABETH CHADWICK,
TRADITIONAL NEUTRALITY REVISITED: LAW, THEORY AND CASE STUDIES (2002); ROBERT
W. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA (1955); George K. Walker,
Information Warfare and Neutrality, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1079 (2000).
13. As a result of Articles 25 and 103 of the United Nations Charter, every
member nation agrees to follow the determinations of the Security Council with
respect to issues of international peace and security. Thus, if the Security Council takes
binding actions under Chapter VII, no nation could rely on the law of neutrality to
avoid compliance with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. See U.N.
Charter art. 25, 103.
14. See, e.g., Georgios C. Petrochilos, The Relevance of the Concepts of War and Armed
Conflict to the Law of Neutrality, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 575, 599–601 (1998)
(discussing the application of the law of neutrality during the Falklands Conflict).
15. This is confirmed by recent manuals written to reflect the current law of
armed conflict (“LOAC”). For instance, Rule 165 of the Humanitarian Policy and Conflict
Research Manual on Air and Missile Warfare reads:
Where the Security Council takes binding preventive or enforcement
measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations—including
the authorization of the use of force by a particular State or group of States—
no State may rely upon the law of neutrality to justify conduct which would be
incompatible with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.
HUMANITARIAN POLICY & CONFLICT RESEARCH, supra note 11, ¶ 165, at 52. Additionally,
Paragraphs 7 and 9 of the International Institute of International Humanitarian Law’s
San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea state:
(7) Notwithstanding any rule in this document or elsewhere on the law of
neutrality, where the Security Council, acting in accordance with its powers
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has identified one
or more of the parties to an armed conflict as responsible for resorting to
force in violation of international law, neutral States: (a) are bound not to
lend assistance other than humanitarian assistance to that State; and (b) may

2012]

CYBER SOVEREIGNTY AND NEUTRALITY

821

Several basic provisions of the law of neutrality deserve
specific mention with relation to cyber operations. First of all,
assuming that State G and State X are involved in an IAC, for a
nation to be neutral, the nation must not be a party to the IAC.17
No formal declaration of neutrality is required by uninvolved
states.18 However, there is no room for either “qualified
neutrality” or for “non-belligerency.”19 States are either neutrals,
or they are participants.
The law of neutrality, combined with the doctrine of
sovereignty, enshrines the inviolability of neutral nations and
places belligerents under a strict obligation to respect the
territorial sovereignty of the neutral.20 In this sense, the territory
of a neutral state comprises “the land territory of Neutrals as
well as sea areas which are under the territorial sovereignty of
the neutral costal State, i.e. internal waters, territorial sea and,
where applicable, archipelagic waters, and the airspace above

lend assistance to any State which has been the victim of a breach of the
peace or an act of aggression by that State;
(9) Subject to paragraph 7, where the Security Council has taken a decision
to use force, or to authorize the use of force by a particular State or States,
the rules set out in this document and any other rules of international
humanitarian law applicable to armed conflicts at sea shall apply to all parties
to any such conflict which may ensue.
INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA ¶¶ 7, 9, at 7–8 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed.,
1995).
16. See, e.g., Joshua E. Kastenberg, Non-Intervention and Neutrality in Cyberspace: An
Emerging Principle in the National Practice of International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 43, 56
(2009); Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with
an Asymmetric Definition, 64 A.F. L. REV. 65, 90 (2009); Walker, supra note 12, at 1182.
17. See, e.g., HUMANITARIAN POLICY & CONFLICT RESEARCH, supra note 11, ¶ 1(aa),
at 6; INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 15, sec. V, ¶ 13(d), at 9; OFFICE OF
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS & HEADQUARTERS ET AL., DEP’T OF THE NAVY, supra
note 10, ¶ 7.1; U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JSP 383, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL ON THE
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 12.11 (Joint Doctrine & Concepts Ctr. ed., 2004).
18. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS & HEADQUARTERS, ET AL.,
supra note 10, ¶ 7.2; OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, DEP’T OF THE NAVY,
NWIP 10-2, LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE ¶ 231, at 2–5 (1955).
19. See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, “Benevolent” Third States in International
Armed Conflicts: The Myth of the Irrelevance of the Law of Neutrality, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 543, 543–68 (Michael Schmitt &
Jelena Pejic eds., 2007) (providing a recent analysis on this issue).
20. See Hague V, supra note 5, art. 1; OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
& HEADQUARTERS ET AL., DEP’T OF THE NAVY, supra note 10, ¶ 7.2.
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those areas.”21 Objects located within the territory of a neutral
state are both subject to that neutral state’s jurisdiction and also
protected by that state’s neutrality irrespective of public or
private ownership and irrespective of the nationality of the
owners.22
The requirement to respect neutral territory prohibits
belligerents from conducting hostilities within neutral territory23
and should be understood in a broad sense. It is not limited to
“attacks” as defined under the law of armed conflict.24
For example, Article 3 of Hague V makes it unlawful for
belligerents to:
a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless
telegraphy station or other apparatus for the purpose of
communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea;
b) Use of any installation of this kind established by them
before the war on the territory of a neutral Power for purely
military purposes, and which has not been opened for the
service of public messages.25

In order to preserve its neutrality, the neutral state also
accepts obligations to affirmatively prevent the use of its territory
by belligerents. This obligation is found in Article 5(1) of the
1907 Hague Convention V, which states: “A neutral Power must
not allow any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 to occur on
its territory.”26 This includes an obligation on the neutral state
to monitor activities on its territory, to the extent that the means
21. HUMANITARIAN POLICY & CONFLICT RESEARCH, COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR
MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 307
(Program on Humanitarian Policy & Conflict Research, Harv. Univ. ed., 2010).
22. See INT’L INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 15, sec. I, ¶ 16, at 11.
23. See, e.g., Hague V, supra note 5, art. 2; Hague XIII, supra note 5, art. 1; OFFICE
OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS & HEADQUARTERS ET AL., DEP’T OF THE NAVY,
supra note 10, ¶ 7.3; MANUAL OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT ¶¶ 1108,
1149 (Federal Ministry of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany ed., VR II 3,
1992); HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, supra note 11, ¶¶ 166–67, at
52; INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 15, ¶ 15, at 11; Hague Rules of Air
Warfare, art. 39, drafted Dec. 1922–Feb. 1923, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
153, 153 (Dietrich Schindler & Juří Toman eds., 1981).
24. See, e.g., Hague XIII, supra note 5, art. 2; HUMANITARIAN POLICY & CONFLICT
RESEARCH, supra note 11, ¶ 171(d), at 54.
25. Hague V, supra note 5, art. 3.
26. Id. art. 5; see also HUMANITARIAN POLICY & CONFLICT RESEARCH, supra note 11,
¶¶ 167(a), 168(a), at 52.
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at its disposal allow, in order to prevent the violation of its
neutrality by the belligerents.27 It would also allow the use of
force in response to any attempted violation of its neutrality by a
belligerent.28
Article 8 of Hague V provides an important exception to
this rule. It states: “A neutral Power is not called upon to forbid
or restrict the use on behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or
telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging
to it or to companies or private individuals.”29
Another key point is clearly stated in the US Navy’s Manual
of the Law of Naval Warfare. It states that “if the neutral nation is
unable or unwilling to enforce effectively its right of inviolability,
an aggrieved belligerent may take such acts as are necessary in
neutral territory to counter the activities of enemy forces,
including warships and military aircraft, making unlawful use of
that territory.”30 This makes sense, as the alternative would
require a belligerent nation to receive attacks without any form
of recourse, thus undercutting the foundational rationale for
neutrality law.
Actions by a belligerent in response to a neutral nation’s
inability or unwillingness to maintain its neutrality would most
certainly constitute a violation of the neutral state’s sovereignty.
Thus, not every action that might technically violate neutrality
would allow belligerent response, but only those that
“constitute[] an immediate threat to the security of the
opposing belligerent.”31 Further, when a belligerent deems that
self-help is required, any actions taken by the belligerent are

27. See, e.g., Hague XIII, supra note 5, art. 8; Hague Rules of Air Warfare, supra
note 23, arts. 42, 47, at 154; MANUAL OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT, supra
note 23, ¶¶ 1109, 1125, 1151; OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS &
HEADQUARTERS ET AL., DEP’T OF THE NAVY, supra note 10, ¶ 7.3; INT’L INST. OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 15, sec. I, ¶¶ 15, 18, 22, at 11–12; HUMANITARIAN
POLICY & CONFLICT RESEARCH, supra note 11, ¶¶ 168(a), 170(b), at 52–53.
28. See Hague V, supra note 5, arts. 5, 10; HUMANITARIAN POLICY & CONFLICT
RESEARCH, supra note 11, ¶¶ 168–70, at 52–53.
29. Hague V, supra note 5, art. 8.
30. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS & HEADQUARTERS ET AL., DEP’T
OF THE NAVY, supra note 10, ¶ 7.3; JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., CANADIAN MINISTRY OF
NAT’L DEFENCE, B-GJ-005-104/FP-02, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL
AND TACTICAL LEVELS ¶ 1304(3), at 13-1 (2001).
31. INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 15, sec. I, ¶ 22, at 11.
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subject to a prior notification and a reasonable time for the
neutral state to terminate the violation.32
While these traditional principles of the law of neutrality
are fairly well-accepted, their application to cyber activities is not
necessarily so clear and deserves analysis.
B. Neutrality and Cyber Operations
The nature of the Internet and cyber activities raises
questions about the application of the law of neutrality to cyber
conflict. For example, when an email is sent across the Internet,
it is broken into smaller “packets” of information, which are
disseminated across the Internet in an undetermined and
undirectable fashion.33 This virtually ensures that malicious code
sent by a belligerent will traverse cyber infrastructure in neutral
nations. Does this mean that the belligerent has violated the laws
of neutrality by sending something across the Internet?
Additionally, those who monitor neutral cyber
infrastructure have limited ability with current technology to
detect malicious packets and either stop or redirect them.34 Do
neutral nations potentially forfeit their neutrality because they
are incapable of preventing potentially hostile packets from
traversing their Internet infrastructure? Answering these and
other similar questions will determine the continuing validity of
the law of neutrality to cyber operations.
1. Belligerents and Cyber Neutrality
The starting point for analyzing belligerent obligations with
respect to cyber activities under the law of neutrality is the basic
premise that belligerents are prohibited from conducting cyber
operations against an enemy from within neutral territory.35 The
same prohibition applies to the use of neutral cyber
infrastructure that is located outside neutral territory in two
cases. The first is if it enjoys the benefits of neutrality because of
sovereign immunity. The second is if it is the private computer
32. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF
OF THE NAVY, supra note 10, ¶ 7.3.

NAVAL OPERATIONS & HEADQUARTERS ET AL., DEP’T

33. See Walker, supra note 12, at 1094–99.
34. See id. at 1158.
35. See Hague V, supra note 5, art. 1.
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infrastructure or systems of a private entity or person from the
neutral country that is not located within belligerent territory.36
In addition to a modernized version of the specific
prohibitions discussed earlier from Article 3 of Hague V, “using”
cyber infrastructure would include things such as initiating an
attack or facilitating an attack within neutral territory. It would
not include, as discussed further below, the mere passage of
malware or malicious code over cyber infrastructure that was
generally open for public use.
As stated above, the prohibition against belligerents
conducting hostilities from neutral territory is to be understood
in a very broad sense. In relation to cyber operations, this
prohibition is not limited to “attacks” as defined under the law
of armed conflict or to “‘acts of cyber warfare” or to “cyber
attacks.” The use of neutral cyber infrastructure for intrusion
into the enemy’s cyber infrastructure to conduct actions harmful
to the opposing belligerent would violate the law of neutrality.
As opposed to “using” a neutral’s cyber infrastructure,
“when Belligerent Parties use for military purposes a public,
internationally and openly accessible network such as the
Internet, the fact that part of this infrastructure is situated
within the jurisdiction of a Neutral does not constitute a
violation of neutrality.”37 A modern interpretation of Article 8 of
Hague V seems to require this conclusion.38 The same
conclusion is supported by US government statements.39
In the event that a neutral nation’s territory, including its
cyber infrastructure, is being used for acts hostile to another
belligerent, the targeted belligerent may respond proportionally
to stop the hostile acts.40 If the hostile actions were coming from
36. See Walker, supra note 12, at 1149–50.
37. HUMANITARIAN POLICY & CONFLICT RESEARCH, supra note 11, ¶ 167(b), at 52.
38. But see Kastenberg, supra note 16, at 56–57; Jeffrey T.G. Kelsey, Hacking into
International Humanitarian Law: The Principles of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of
Cyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1427, 1442–45 (2008) (arguing that Article 8 does not
apply to cyberspace); Todd, supra note 16, at 90–92.
39. See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., AN ASSESSMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS 23 (1999); Kelsey, supra
note 38, at 1442.
40. See HUMANITARIAN POLICY & CONFLICT RESEARCH, supra note 11, ¶ 168(b), at
53; OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS & HEADQUARTERS ET AL., DEP’T OF THE
NAVY, supra note 10, ¶ 7.3; INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 15, sec. I,
¶ 22, at 12.
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the neutral nation’s cyber infrastructure, an appropriate
response could include targeting the neutral nation’s cyber
infrastructure with either a cyber or kinetic response.
Alternatively, a targeted nation could also respond to a
noncyber hostile act from a neutral nation’s territory with a
cyber operation that would terminate the hostile act.
2. Neutrals and Cyber Neutrality
The basic responsibility of neutrals found in Article 5(1) of
Hague V applies equally in cyber conflict.41 Therefore, a neutral
state must not knowingly allow acts of cyber warfare to be
launched from cyber infrastructure located in its territory or
under its exclusive control. This prohibition applies not only to
instances where the organs of the state have actual knowledge of
a belligerent act of cyber warfare, but also to cases of
presumptive knowledge. For example, if the neutral state does
not have sophisticated cyber infrastructure of its own and has
therefore contracted with a commercial provider, the neutral
state would be presumed to have knowledge possessed by that
commercial provider.
In order to effectively maintain neutrality, a neutral state
has a duty to effectively monitor, to the best of its ability, its own
territory and infrastructure in order to prevent the launching of
an act of cyber warfare from its territory or from cyber
infrastructure it effectively controls. This duty to monitor is
necessarily dependent upon the means and personnel available
to the neutral state and upon the neutral state’s level of
technology, but a neutral nation must do everything feasible to
maintain its neutrality by monitoring its cyber networks and
precluding their use for hostile acts.42 If, despite its best efforts, a
belligerent act of cyber warfare is not prevented, the neutral
state has violated its duty of prevention and leaves itself open to
belligerent response as discussed above.43
The obligation for a neutral nation to not knowingly allow
acts of cyber warfare from within its territory also necessarily

41. Hague V, supra note 5, art. 5(1); see HUMANITARIAN POLICY & CONFLICT
RESEARCH, supra note 11, ¶ 168(a), at 52.
42. This is based on the requirement found in Hague V, supra note 5, art. 5.
43. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
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authorizes the neutral state to take cyber actions (or kinetic
actions, if necessary) to prevent such use. In other words, a
neutral state would be absolutely authorized to strike back with
cyber operations in an attempt to prevent a belligerent from
using its territory or infrastructure for the commission of a
hostile act.44
It is important to note once again that this obligation
applies only to hostile cyber acts that are “launched” from
within the neutral territory and not from hostile traffic merely
transiting the neutral nation’s cyber infrastructure. Therefore,
the mere fact that military communications, including cyber
attacks, have been transmitted via the cyber infrastructure of a
neutral state may not be considered a violation of that state’s
neutral obligations.
C. Applying Neutrality Law to the Scenario
Having briefly reviewed the law of neutrality and analyzed
its implications to cyber operations, it is now time to apply the
law to the scenario proposed at the beginning of the Article.
Remember that State G and State X are in an international
armed conflict, meaning that the LOAC applies, including the
law of neutrality. Further, State G wants to conduct a cyber
attack on State X.
The first action taken by State G is to send an agent across
the border into neutral State H carrying a cyber tool on a thumb
drive. Once within State H, G’s agent enters a cyber café and
plugs the thumb drive into one of the computers. Upon
activation, the cyber tool is copied to the hard drive and
establishes a beacon that waits until contacted by another tool.
Article 2 of Hague V prohibits the movement of “troops or
convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the
territory of a neutral Power.”45 This has been interpreted to
preclude moving “troops or war materials and supplies across
neutral land territory.”46 A modern analysis requires a

44. Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of
Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 179, 209 (2006).
45. Hague V, supra note 5, art. 2.
46. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS & HEADQUARTERS ET AL., DEP’T
OF THE NAVY, supra note 10, ¶ 7.3.1.
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determination of whether the cyber tool was “war material” or
“supplies.” Given the facts, it is likely that when G’s agent crosses
the border into neutral H with the thumb drive containing
software intended to facilitate a cyber attack on X, he is violating
State H’s neutrality. The opposing argument is that software that
merely establishes a beacon that attracts additional cyber
software, or even combines with or supplements that software, is
not a war material or supply. This position appears hard to
support, as the insertion of the thumb drive and subsequent
action from the computer are essential elements of the eventual
attack. The better answer is that such an action during
international armed conflict violates the neutrality of State H.
The next event occurs shortly thereafter. Another agent of
State G offers free thumb drives under the guise of a
promotional gimmick from a local business to customers
boarding a commercial cruise ship flagged in neutral State M,
leaving from a port in neutral State R. Once the cruise ship has
left the port and entered the high seas, any customer who plugs
the thumb drive into the ship’s passenger computers will upload
a malicious malware that will become resident on the ship’s
computer. The ship’s computers connect to the Internet
through a commercial carrier satellite operated by a company
registered in neutral State F. Once the computer is connected
with the Internet, the malicious malware on the ship’s computer
sends a signal across the Internet, seeking the beacon that is
now resident on a computer in State H. When the shipboard
cyber tool has connected with the beacon, a code is executed
that sends a piece of a malicious cyber program to the beacon.
Multiple actions and neutral nations are involved in this
action. For the same reasons discussed above, it is likely that G
violates R’s neutrality when its agent entered R’s territory with
the thumb drives since they contained the malicious malware.
Based on Article 8 of Hague V, neither M nor F has an
obligation to prevent G from using the privately owned
shipboard computers or the privately owned satellite
communication system to facilitate the attack on X.47 However,
because the privately owned cruise ship was flagged by neutral
47. While not the subject of this Article, these actions by State G likely raise
significant LOAC issues concerning the principle of distinction and the role that
civilians would unwittingly play in the attack.
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State M and because the agent of State G intends to use the
commercially owned network of a private company
headquartered in State F, G has violated the neutrality of both of
these states as well. The fact that the malware is not uploaded
until the cruise ship is on the high seas removes any further
violation of neutrality that would have occurred if the uplink
would have happened while still in the territorial waters of State
R. Because the high seas are not subject to any state’s
sovereignty, the geographic location of the ship does not
implicate the doctrines of sovereignty or neutrality.
Upon arrival at the computer in State H, the malicious
malware from the shipboard computer combines with the cyber
tool at the beacon and creates cyber malware that is then
forwarded to a computer in State X to which State G has
previously gained access. State G gained access to the computer
in State X through the work of a citizen of neutral State J, which
State G had hired for that purpose. Once the cyber malware
reaches the computer in State X, it initiates an action that
amounts to an attack on State X causing death and destruction.
The neutrality issue here concerns the use of a private
citizen from neutral State J to gain access to a computer system
within State X, facilitating the eventual attack. Article 16 of
Hague V states that “[t]he nationals of a State which is not
taking part in the war are considered as neutrals.”48 However,
Article 17 states:
A neutral cannot avail himself of his neutrality (a) If he
commits hostile acts against a belligerent; (b) If he commits
acts in favor of a belligerent, particularly if he voluntarily
enlists in the ranks of the armed force of one of the parties.
In such a case, the neutral shall not be more severly [sic]
treated by the belligerent as against whom he has
abandoned his neutrality than a national of the other
belligerent State could be for the same act.49

The civilian hired by the agent of State G enjoys protection
based on State J’s neutrality until he decides to act for State G
and performs an act hostile to State X. At the point that he
makes that decision, he loses his protections as a neutral and,
48. Hague V, supra note 5, art. 16.
49. Id., supra note 5, art. 17.
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depending on the nature of his hostile act, may lose his
protection as a civilian.50 However, this has no effect on the
neutrality of State J. Additionally, there are no further neutrality
implications as these events occur within State X, the other
belligerent in the armed conflict.
Therefore, in this IAC scenario, State G has violated the
neutrality of States H, R, M, and F, but not J, although the
specific individual citizen of J has forfeited his neutral
protections. Despite the lack of complete precision, current
neutrality law is fairly clear in its application to the IAC scenario.
However, the vast majority of conflicts over the past six decades
have not been IACs, but NIACs.51 It is to this type of armed
conflict that this Article will now turn to discuss.
II. CYBER OPERATIONS AND NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT
Despite the convenience of having a clear set of laws that
apply to cyber operations in IAC, the reality of the current world
situation is that cyber attacks have seldom, if ever, occurred
between nation states during armed conflict. The United States
contemplated doing so during the invasion of Iraq in 200352 and
again against Libya’s el-Qaddafi regime in 2011.53 Some have
50. There is currently a continuing debate on the actions that a civilian might take
to be considered as directly participating in hostilities or targetable as a member of an
organized armed group. See J. Ricou Heaton, Civilians at War: Reexamining the Status of
Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces, 57 A.F. L. Rev. 155, 157–58 (2005); Richard S.
Taylor, The Capture Versus Kill Debate: Is the Principle of Humanity Now Part of the Targeting
Analysis When Attacking Civilians Who Are Directly Participating in Hostilities?, 2010 ARMY
L. 103, 108–09 (2010).
51. The Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research has
compiled extensive research on the issue of armed conflicts. See Program Overview,
DEP’T PEACE & CONFLICT RESEARCH-UPPSALA UNIV., http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/
ucdp/program_overview/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). For a graphic representation of
the numbers of international armed conflicts (“IACs”) and non-international armed
conflicts (“NIACs”), see Armed Conflict by Type, 1946–2009, DEP’T PEACE & CONFLICT
RESEARCH-UPPSALA UNIV., http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/20/20864_conflict_
types_2009.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
52. Judi Hasson, US Considered 2003 Cyber Attack on Iraq, FIERCEGOVERNMENTIT
(Aug. 2, 2009, 4:10 PM), http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/u-s-considered2003-cyber-attack-iraq/2009-08-02.
53. Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S. Wrestles with Cyberwar’s Place; White House
Refrained from Tactics in Libya, Fearful of a Precedent, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 19, 2011,
at 5.
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argued that Russia coordinated activist attacks on both Estonia
in 200754 and Georgia in 2008.55 At latest report, more than 100
nations either currently have or are actively pursuing cyber
capabilities.56 However, to date, no state has either claimed to
have executed cyber attacks on another government or claimed
to have been the target of cyber attacks by another government
during armed conflict.
This lack of official state-sponsored cyber attacks is not
indicative of the amount of cyber activities that are occurring
across the world, including those that either target nations or
are conducted by nations.57 The pervasiveness of cyber attacks
have been well-documented elsewhere58 and do not need to be
repeated here. However, it is important to note that states are
increasingly concerned about the prospect of cyber conflict

54. Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A
Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201
MIL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009); A Look at Estonia’s Cyber Attack in 2007, MSNBC.COM (July 8,
2009, 2:24 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31801246/ns/technology_and_
science-security/t/look-estonias-cyber-attack/; President Ilves, Speech on the Occasion
of International Cyber Conflict Legal and Policy Conference in Tallinn (Sept. 9, 2009)
(transcript available at http://www.eesti.ca/?op=article&articleid=25139) [hereinafter
President Ilves’s Speech].
55. Sklerov, supra note 54, at 4–5; William Matthews, China is Most Formidable Cyber
Foe, Experts Warn, FED. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2010, at 13; President Ilves’s Speech, supra note
54.
56. Andrea Shala-Esa & Jim Finkle, NSA Helps Banks Battle Hackers, REUTERS (Oct.
26, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/27/us-cybersecurity-banks-id
USTRE79P5E020111027.
57. This is not to say that governments are not sponsoring or conducting a great
deal of cyber activity. See Cybersecurity Task Force Releases Recommendations, Rep. Mac
Thornberry (R-TX) News Release, FED. INFO. & NEWS DISPATCH, INC., Oct. 5, 2011,
available at LEXIS. Recently, the US Congress has held a number of hearings on China
state-sponsored theft of intellectual property. Douglas Birch, US Lawmaker Slams China
for Cyber Spying, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 4, 2011, available at LEXIS. However, these
cyber operations have generally been on defense contractors or other corporate
entities and not on the US government itself, and certainly not during an armed
conflict. Further, if “attack” were defined in accordance with the LOAC, it would
require an “act of violence.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol 1) art. 49, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. See generally Paul A.
Walker, Rethinking Computer Network “Attack”: Implications for Law and U.S. Doctrine, 1
NAT’L SEC. L. BRIEF 33 (2011). For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to say that
no attacks during armed conflict have occurred between nations.
58. See generally Hollis, supra note 2.

832 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:815
from other states, individuals, and nonstate actors.59 In an
environment where states, terrorist organizations, criminal
enterprises, and individuals are all equally as likely to be
“attackers” as they are to be targets, differentiating between
cyber incidents and the law that they implicate is vital.
A. Cyber Crime or Armed Conflict
The determination of what law applies to a cyber event
depends largely on how that event is characterized.
Characterizing an event is aided by knowing the actor and
activity that has occurred. For example, an intrusion into a
government logistics system by recreational hackers60 is almost
certainly going to be considered a criminal activity, and any
retributive action will likely be taken through the criminal law
system of the hackers’ nations, even if that event occurs during
an on-going IAC. However, if the same intrusion was coming
from state actors of another state, such an act would likely be
understood in a different light and, depending on the
seriousness of the event, might be considered an armed attack
initiating hostilities61 or part of the on-going IAC.
It is clear that most of the cyber events that occur are
merely criminal events and should be handled under domestic
criminal law. However, it is also clear that cyber operations are
very likely to take place in armed conflicts, even those not
involving interstate conflict. Acts that would be criminal and
59. Eric Talbot Jensen, Ten Questions, Responses to the Ten Questions: President
Obama and the Changing Cyber Paradigm, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5049 (2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1740904 (noting that
[d]uring a time of significantly reduced budgets, the UK government made
some difficult decisions on the allocation of defense resources. In a move that
would shock most other nations, the United Kingdom opted to forego the
production of aircraft capable aircraft carriers and allocate those resources to
expanding and maintaining its cyber defenses).
60. See Hollis, supra note 2, at 400 (discussing a major hacking event of the US
military logistics operations by two teenagers from California and their mentor from
Israel).
61. This Article is concerned mainly with the jus in bello, but it is as of yet an
undecided question as to what cyber activities would amount to a use of force or armed
attack under the jus ad bellum. See generally OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF., supra note 39; Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885
(1999).
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handled by domestic criminal law in the absence of an armed
conflict will invoke the LOAC applying to NIAC if done in
connection with an armed conflict. The potential frequency of
this possibility requires a closer look at the law in NIAC that
applies to cyber events.
B. The Law in NIAC
Where IACs are governed by the full LOAC, NIACs are
governed by a much less robust set of laws.62 Most states,63
courts,64 and academics65 agree that many LOAC provisions
apply to NIACs, such as the principle of distinction in selecting
and engaging targets. But it is clear that many LOAC principles,
including the law of neutrality and its impact on sovereignty, are
only applicable during an IAC.66 This leaves states with limited
62. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
63. See U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 17, ¶¶ 15.5–15.33, at 388–400. Both
the United States and Canada have stated that they will apply the provisions of the
LOAC during NIACs. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 2311.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR
PROGRAM ¶ 4.1 (2006); JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., CANADIAN MINISTRY OF NATIONAL
DEFENCE, supra note 30, ¶ 1702.2, at 17-1.
64. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 119 (Int’l Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995) (“What is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars,
cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife.”). The same Court also stated:
“If international law, while of course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of
States, must gradually turn to the protection of human beings, it is only natural that the
[distinction between IAC and NIAC] should gradually lose its weight.” Id. ¶ 97; see also
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(e), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90, 97–98.
65. See, e.g., MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN,
INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN L., THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT: WITH COMMENTARY (2006); see 1 & 2 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS &
LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005)
(describing rules governing the law or armed conflict in Volume 1, which are
supported by annotated state practice in Volume 2); J.M. Henckaerts, Study on
Customary International Humanitarian Law, Annex, available at http://www.icrc.org/
eng/assets/files/other/customary-law-rules.pdf
(listing
customary
rules
of
international humanitarian law and designating which rules apply to IAC, NIAC, or
both).
66. See, e.g., von Heinegg, supra note 19, at 561 (“Some parts of the law of
neutrality . . . become applicable in an international armed conflict only when and
insofar as the belligerents resort to recognized methods and means by, for example,
interfering with neutral shipping and aviation.”); HUMANITARIAN POLICY & CONFLICT
RESEARCH, supra note 21, at 305 (“The law of neutrality exclusively applies to
Belligerent Parties, on the one side, and to Neutrals, on the other. Accordingly, Section
X does not apply to non-international armed conflicts.”).
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guidance concerning the rights and duties with respect to cyber
operations of both the belligerent state and states not involved
in the NIAC.67
There is no clear analogy to the law of neutrality that
specifically defines the interactions of states in a NIAC. There
are, however, some principles that provide guidance to both
belligerent and uninvolved states.
Article 2 of the UN Charter, which applies at all times,
including a time of NIAC, essentially solidifies territorial
sovereignty as one of the underlying principles of international
law.68 The Charter precludes the use of force against the
territorial sovereignty of another state, especially in cases of
purely domestic issues, except when initiated by the UN Security
Council.69 Therefore, a state involved in a NIAC would have to
respect the territorial sovereignty of any other state, including
states in which transnational terrorists or insurgent movements
were harboured or at least not expelled. Of course, if the state
was actually supporting or facilitating the insurgents, the NIAC
might transform into an IAC, and the earlier discussion would
be applicable.
There are also norms on state responsibility that preclude
internationally wrongful acts and provide remedies in the case
of injury or damage.70 However, in the absence of something
similar to the detailed LOAC provisions, there is limited
guidance for what cyber actions would constitute a violation of a
state’s territorial sovereignty in a NIAC. Unlike the law of
neutrality, which provides a fairly specific understanding of what
states can and cannot do in neutral nations, there is no such
clarity in a NIAC.
67. See SCHMITT, GARRAWAY & DINSTEIN, supra note 65 (containing thoughtful
and extensive analysis on the laws applicable to the conduct of operations during a
NIAC, but neither addressing the rights and duties of nonparticipants, nor the rights
and duties of belligerent parties toward nonparticipants, analogous to the laws of
neutrality during an IAC).
68. See U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
69. See U.N. Charter art. 2(7).
70. For example, the International Law Commission has proposed articles on state
responsibility that are still in draft but are accepted by many states as restating
customary international law. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d sess, Apr. 23–June 1,
July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 [hereinafter ILC 53d Report]; see also JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 61–74 (2002).
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The law applicable to uninvolved states is no clearer.
Beginning early in the formulation of international law and
becoming codified in a series of arbitrations and cases including
the Trail Smelter arbitration71 and the International Court of
Justice’s (“ICJ”) Corfu Channel case,72 the principle that a state
cannot knowingly allow its territory to be used to the detriment
of another state has become universally accepted. This is often
referred to as the “no harm” principle and should be equally
applicable to cyber operations in a NIAC.73 This would mean
that any state involved in a NIAC, and every state that is not a
party to the NIAC, has an obligation to not allow its territory,
including its cyber capabilities and infrastructure, to be used to
harm another state.
While the law of neutrality applicable in IAC provides at
least some definition on hostile acts and adds workable
provisions on the use of public communications networks such
as telephone and telegraph, simply precluding anything
detrimental to another state lacks specificity sufficient to be a
workable standard in the cyber context.
Perhaps most importantly, where the obligations of
neutrality fell on all states involved in an IAC equally—whether
neutral or belligerent—there is no such legal obligation upon
the nonstate party to the NIAC. This leaves only the domestic
laws of the various states to sort out the cyber actions of the
nonstate participant in a NIAC, a situation that is highly
problematic.
These difficulties can be illustrated by reviewing the
“modified” scenario and attempting to determine the legality of
nonstate Actor G’s actions.
C. The Modified Scenario
The scenario at the beginning of the Article set out a
situation where State G was in an IAC with State X and took
71. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1907 (1941).
72. The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) held that every state had an
“obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights
of other States.” Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
73. See Eric Talbot Jensen, The International Law of Environmental Warfare: Active
and Passive Damage During Times of Armed Conflict, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 145, 158–
60 (2005).
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certain cyber actions, involving parties and states that were not
involved in the conflict but who were neutral. In the modified
scenario, G is no longer a state but rather a nonstate actor—
perhaps a transnational terrorist organization—and takes the
same cyber actions against State X as part of an ongoing NIAC.
In the modified scenario, the first action taken is that an
agent of nonstate actor G uses his tourist passport to lawfully
enter neutral State H, carrying a cyber tool on a thumb drive.
Once within H, G’s agent enters a cyber café and plugs the
thumb drive into one of the computers. Upon activation, the
malicious cyber tool is copied to the hard drive and establishes a
beacon that then awaits contact by another tool.
When applying the laws of neutrality in an IAC, this action
by the agent of State G is a violation of neutrality and therefore
illegal; in a NIAC, there is no neutrality to violate. Because the
agent is not an agent of a state, the UN Charter proscription on
violating the territorial integrity of H is not implicated. Further,
under the “no harm” principle, states are obligated to not
knowingly allow their territory to be used to harm other states.
Because the harm is done by a civilian member of a terrorist
organization, there is no breach of the “no harm” principle, and
State H’s legal response is likely limited to trying to capture the
agent (if he is still in H or if H can get him through extradition
if he is not) and apply H’s domestic criminal law response. As
illustrated by the inability of the Philippines to prosecute the
initiator of the “I Love You” malware, prosecution for the acts
done by the agent of G may not even be possible in all states.74
Moving on in the scenario, soon after the previous event,
another agent of G offers free thumb drives under the guise of a
promotional gimmick from a local business to customers
boarding a commercial cruise ship flagged in neutral State M,
leaving from a port in neutral State R. Once the cruise ship
entered the high seas, any customer who plugs the thumb drive
into the ship’s passenger computers will upload a malicious
malware which then becomes resident on the ship’s computer.
74. See MCCONNELL INT’L, CYBER CRIME . . . AND PUNISHMENT? ARCHAIC LAWS
THREATEN GLOBAL INFORMATION 3–4 (2000), available at http://www. witsa. org/
papers/McConnell-cybercrime.pdf.; Ann Harrison, ‘Love Bug’ Investigation Wrapping Up
in Philippines, COMPUTERWORLD, June 9, 2000, http://www.computerworld.com/s/
article/45677/_Love_Bug_investigation_wrapping_up_in_Philippines.
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The ship’s computers connect to the Internet through a
commercial carrier satellite operated by a company registered in
neutral country F. Once the computer is connected with the
Internet, the malicious malware on the ship’s computer sends a
signal across the Internet, seeking the beacon that is now
resident on a computer in State H.
When the doctrine of neutrality applied because the
conflict was an IAC, the agent’s entrance into R and transport of
the cyber weapon was a violation of R’s neutrality. As above with
State H, this would not be the case here. The actions of G’s
agent with respect to R would only be prosecutable if R had
some domestic proscription to providing free thumb drives and
if R could get jurisdiction for any potential criminal activity from
the onboard actions of the passengers. Further, the use by
State G of the neutral private ship’s computer systems and the
neutral commercial satellite system were also violations of the
law of neutrality. Because these principles are based on the
duties of states, the civilian agent of transnational terrorist
group G is subject only to the domestic criminal laws of M and F,
again assuming they can identify the agent and then gain
custody in order to prosecute. As in the IAC scenario, the
geographic location of the ship on the high seas removes any
territorial claims of jurisdiction for the criminal acts, although
other jurisdictional claims would still apply.
Finally, once the shipboard cyber tool has connected with
the beacon on the computer in State H, a code is executed that
sends a malicious cyber program to the beacon. Upon arrival at
the computer in State H, it combines with the cyber tool at the
beacon and creates cyber malware that is then forwarded to a
computer in State X to which G has previously gained access. G
gained access to the computer in State X by hiring a citizen of
neutral State J to create an access for the specific malware that G
created. Once the cyber malware reaches the computer in State
X, it initiates an action that amounts to an attack on State X that
causes death and destruction.
In the NIAC modified scenario, J is not a neutral and the
hired citizen is merely a current resident of State X. He does not
have any neutral protections to violate. He is most likely subject
to the domestic law of X and can be prosecuted for any illegal
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activity in which he participates. Hiring the civilian has no legal
ramifications on G.
So, under the modified scenario, G as an organization is not
legally constrained from taking any of the proposed actions.
Further, in the case of the actions taken in States H, R, M, and F,
members of G risk only the attenuated potential of criminal
prosecution. J’s citizen who is working for G in State X also
might be subject to criminal penalties.
III. APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES OF NEUTRALITY TO CYBER
OPERATIONS IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS
For many who believe that domestic criminal law is the
correct paradigm to deal with terrorism, the previous section
will likely not raise many concerns. However, for those who want
to create disincentives for terrorist organizations and other
nonstate actors to use cyber activities to forward their ends, the
lack of legal deterrence for the nonstate actor in the scenario
will be troubling. Evolving the law to provide legal limitations on
the actions of nonstate actors grounded in the LOAC should
prove beneficial, if effectively accomplished.
In NIACs, where as a matter of definition the conflict is
between a state bound by the LOAC and a nonstate actor who is
not, international law creates an asymmetry that is likely to
discourage lawfulness on the part of the nonstate actor. These
groups, such as insurgent groups or terrorist organizations, who
are almost always working at a logistical disadvantage because of
a lack of resources and organization, will certainly see the lack of
LOAC applicability to them as an advantage to be maximized.
In recent years, using the law to one’s advantage during
armed conflict has been termed “lawfare” and often implies
illegal acts by a nonstate actor.75 However, in the case of
75. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Is “LAWFARE” a Useful Term?: Does Lawfare Need an
Apologia?, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 121 (2010); Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare: A
Decisive Element of 21st-Century Conflicts?, 54 JOINT FORCE Q. 34 (2009), available at
http:// www. dtic. mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA515192&Location=U2&doc=
GetTRDoc.pdf; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT’L. AFF.
146, 146 (2008); Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving
Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Carr Ctr. for Human Rights, John F.
Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard U., Working Paper, 2001), available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%
20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf.
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applying neutrality in cyber conflict, the actions taken in the
modified scenario above were not violations of the LOAC, even
if some of them may have been violations of domestic law.
Rather, it is the lack of applicable regulation in this area that
encourages nonstate actors to take similar actions, knowing that
the state they were engaging would have far more limited
responses available to it to prevent or remedy the violation. For
this reason, the law should be adapted to place legal constraints,
such as the doctrine of neutrality, on nonstate actors in NIAC.
A. The Benefits
Applying the doctrines of neutrality to NIACs would have a
number of benefits. First, it would level the playing field
between parties to the conflict. Currently, states engaged in
NIAC are also not bound by the doctrine of neutrality, but are
bound by the doctrine of sovereignty and the UN Charter’s
preclusion of acts that violate another state’s territorial
integrity.76 This legal limitation does not apply to nonstate actors
and allows actions such as those in the modified scenario to
occur. Having all parties bound by the same rules reduces the
use of law as a weapon and adds to the predictability of actions
within the conflict.
Additionally, applying the law of neutrality would add to
the protections for states that are not involved in the NIAC.
Requiring all parties, including nonstate actors, to refrain from
taking any actions that were hostile to a party to the conflict
from within a neutral state would provide neutral states with
increased security and likely decrease the risk of escalation of
the conflict through the actions of others.
Finally, giving nonparties the formal status of neutrals
would also provide those states with another set of legal rights by
which it could enforce its sovereignty. In other words,
considering the modified scenario, turning the nonparty state
into a neutral provides another legal paradigm (along with
domestic criminal law) by which the nonparty state could
prevent or punish the actions of both the nonstate actor and
potentially the state party to the NIAC for cyber operations that
violated its neutrality.
76. U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
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B. The Process
While these benefits would clearly advance the cause of
international peace and security, they would only do so if parties
were compliant. This is particularly difficult in the case of
nonstate actors. As with all situations of lawfare, the problem is
not only the law, but also seeking compliance.77 Benefits would
still accrue even if states only applied the doctrine of neutrality
to NIACs. However, the real benefits of this initiative would be
much greater if nonstate actors were also incentivized to comply.
Accomplishing the application of neutrality to NIACs would
be difficult, but not insurmountable. The first step could be for
states to make unilateral declarations that they would apply the
law of neutrality to NIACs, not only binding them to apply the
principles when they were involved in a NIAC, but also giving
them the rights of neutrals toward NIACs in which they are not
parties. At some future point, it might be useful to seek a formal
treaty expanding the Hague Conventions to NIACs.
As part of the decision to apply the law of neutrality to
NIACs, the international community would also have to
determine methodologies to incentivize nonstate actors to
commit themselves to the application of neutrality to the NIAC.
Resolving this issue is an ongoing problem in international law
and one that is beyond the scope of this Article. However, there
are a number of scholars who have written on this issue and
have proposed interesting ideas on how to pursue nonstate
compliance.78
Some encouraging steps are already occurring. Nonstate
actors are engaging in the legal process and voluntarily
accepting obligations that they otherwise might not have.79 This
is a process that should be supported and expanded. It would

77. Jakob Kellenberger, President of the Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Speech on
Strengthening Legal Protection for Victims of Armed Conflicts (Sept. 21, 2010),
available at http:// www. icrc. org/eng/resources/documents/statement/ihldevelopment-statement-210910.htm.
78. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Hybrid Sources of Law: Armed
Groups and the Creation of International Law, YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming).
79. See id. (detailing a number of recent statements and actions by nonstate
organized armed groups indicating willingness and a commitment to voluntarily
comply with the LOAC).
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not only pave the way for the application of neutrality to NIAC,
but also for the application of the LOAC more generally.
CONCLUSION
The doctrines of sovereignty and neutrality are some of the
most difficult issues in cyber conflict due to the structure of the
Internet and the protocols by which it operates, including the
inability to direct the path over which Internet traffic travels.
Cyber activities in general and cyber conflict in particular place
stress on traditional LOAC notions, challenging both belligerent
nations and neutral nations in the application of law to cyber
operations. As cyber capabilities increase both at the national
level and at the nonstate actor level, the principle of territorial
sovereignty will come under increasing pressure, particularly
during times of cyber conflict.
The current law of neutrality can continue to have meaning
and provide clarity in the cyber age with few modifications and
modernized understandings. For example, recognizing that
Internet traffic that traverses the computer infrastructure of a
neutral nation is not a violation of that nation’s neutrality
provides greater clarity to states planning cyber operations or
desiring to maintain neutrality.
Additionally, applying neutrality to NIACs, where the
traditional doctrine of neutrality is not currently applicable,
would also prove extremely useful in preventing actions by both
states and nonstate actors that might tend to escalate the
conflict. Applying the law of neutrality to NIACs would provide
nonparties to the NIAC an additional legal paradigm to prevent
cyber actions within their territory. Admittedly, making
neutrality apply as a matter of law would require actions by both
states and nonstate actors, but these are not insurmountable
difficulties.
The law of neutrality is still a binding legal doctrine in the
cyber age and can have increasing utility by incorporating
modern understandings of its applicability and by extending its
coverage to parties and nonparties in NIACs.

